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Summary
The paper on monetary policy presented by Robert V. Roosa is not
available for inclusion in this volume. The main contents of the
paper are presented here in a summary prepared by the editor.
The effectiveness of monetary policy in promoting stability, and
the means by which it can be most effective, depend upon the
phase of the business cycle and upon the nature of the monetary
influence at work in the particular cyclical situation.
Five different roles of monetary influence in cyclical fluctuations
may be distinguished:
1. Causal, in terms of the aggregate supply of money and credit
2. Causal, in terms of the selective influence of shifts within the
distribution of the available volume of credit that create seri-
ous distortions in the pattern of demand
3. Accelerating, in the aggregative sense
4. Accelerating, in the selective sense
5. Expediting, or passive, in the sense of "servicing" without
either initiating causally or accelerating the effects of other
causes
Even in this fifth case, where monetary factors neither cause nor
accelerate expansion or contraction, there will be an opportunity
to use monetary policy to offset or control the underlying causal
influences.
The first case, in which the aggregate supply of bank reserves
and money exert a causal influence upon business, is unlikely to be
important in the United States any more. Control directed to the
volume of bank reserves alone (along with control over the re-
serve ratio) should be adequate to check any monetary and credit
expansion that could threaten to become so large, in the aggregate,
as to be an initiating cause of inflation. Conversely, since the only
circumstances in which a general shortage of money and credit
would precipitate an economic contraction appear to be those in
which reserve funds suddenly become inadequate or secondary re-
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serves become frozen, a policy of increasing the volume of reserves
could, if pushed far enough soon enough, prevent that potential
cause of contraction.
Restraining Excesses during the Boom
Monetary policy can make its main contribution to economic
stability by removing or reducing the financial causes of "over-
exhilaration" during periods of prosperity or boom.
A "narrow" policy of restraining the growth of total bank re-
serves by Federal Reserve operations confined to the Treasury bill
market would probably be sufficient to limit any tendency for the
credit mechanism to accelerate the forces of inflation. However, if
the forces of expansion are very strong, the central bank may be-
come instrumental in causing an actual collapse in using reserve
requirements to check the inflationary forces. Moreover, so limited
a policy will not be able to cope with distortions that may have
serious general consequences. And it will be unable to cope with
nonmonetary causes of instability in the boom.
A more pervasive and more selective monetary policy will be
needed, a policy that will enable the central bank, by direct con-
tact, to maintain varying degrees of pressure in all parts of the
capital market. The central bank should be able to exert a restrain-
ing influence on the markets for longer-term funds without having
to tighten the short-term market so severely as to cause a financial
stalemate of some sort. Also it should be possible to direct the in-
fluence of monetary policy in such a way as to restrain a tendency
for credit factors to accentuate distortion among sectors of the
economy—such as, for example, a relative flooding of funds into
the mortgage market.
In order to meet these requirements of a restraining policy in
booms, the monetary authority should be free to conduct open-
market transactions in government securities of various maturities
and should not be confined to dealing in bills. Even this broader
use of open-market policy may not be enough. The central bank
should have stand-by authority to use selective controls in parts of
the market where impersonal regulations can be devised and ad-
ministered.
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Cushioning the Upper Turning Point
As the fOrces of expansion weaken, and the economy enters a
plateau, with signs or danger of a decline, there are two things that
monetary policy can do.
First, it should prevent financial panic. This is now generally re-
garded as assured.
Second, it should minimize any financial pressures that might
accentuate a tendency toward decline. The most effective way to
do this will be to remove from the minds of lenders any expecta-
tion of further increase in interest rates and create the expectation
of a decline. This change in expectations should extend throughout
the maturity structure. It will be most important in the longer
maturities, where the fact and expectation of lower interest rates can
create the fact and expectation of large appreciation in capital
values.
A monetary policy that operates in all parts of the maturity range
will be able to achieve the desired results more quickly than opera-
tions confined to Treasury bills and without action so extreme as to
suggest that the central bank regards the situation as critical.
Resisting a Downswing
If monetary policy has prevented the development of serious
credit distortions or excesses on the upswing and at the upper turn-
ing point, the causes of a downswing would center in the physical
processes in the economy. In this case, monetary policy would have
two functions:
•1. It should aim to prevent the development within the financial
mechanism of cumulative factors that would aggravate the down-
turn. Concentration on expanding bank reserves by open-market
operations in Treasury bills would be relatively ineffective for this
purpose; it would be unable to bring about the kind of change in
expectations that would help to halt a cumulative acceleration.
2. It should try to work through the monetary and credit mecha-
nism to counter disruptive downward developments in the physical
sectors. A state of credit ease, brought about by expansion of bank re-
serves, may well have important stimulative influence, particularly
in the case of borrowers for whom current economic fluctuations are•
less important than long-range prospects. To assure a wide diffu-
sion of credit ease, without so sharp a reduction of interest rates as
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to create havoc among institutional investors, the central bank
should be able to inject funds directly into the various segments of
the market.
Combating a Cumulative Downswing and Deep Depression
In a cumulative downswing or deep depression the appropriate
monetary policy would be one of outright ease, which would have a
valuable ameliorative effect. The main responsibility for combating
the depression would, however, lie with other measures, notably
fiscal policy.
In addition to creating a general condition of credit ease, finan-
cial policy can take other steps to limit the enfOrced, or distress,
liquidation of assets and debt. These steps include:
1, Checking the tendency for bank examination standards to be-
come tighter during a depression.
2. Avoiding bank closings and their consequences. Protection
against bank closings is a]ready substantially assured by the estab-
lishment of Federal Deposit Insurance and the authorization for the
Federal Reserve banks to lend on any assets of any bank.
3. Avoiding pressure for banks to liquidate private credits to
meet loss of deposits in depression. This is probably taken care of
by the large amounts of government securities held by banks and
by the widened lending authority of the Federal Reserve banks.
4. Direct lending to nonbank enterprises by the central bank. The
amount of such lending is likely to be small. However, the authority
and machinery should be kept available to permit some testing of
the possibilities of special need during the stages of a downswing.
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